Business underperformance in the upstream oil and gas industry, and the failure of many decisions to return expected results, has led to a growing interest over the past few years in understanding the impacts of decisionmaking tools and processes and their relationship to decision outcomes. A primary observation is that different decision types require different decision-making approaches to achieve optimal outcomes.
IntrODuctIOn
The upstream oil and gas industry is characterised by projects involving a series of increasingly expensive investments that subsequently generate revenue streams which are highly uncertain, and, in some cases, never recover the cost of the investments. The magnitude of these investments frequently amounts to hundreds or thousands of millions of dollars. These projects, within the industry, are often characterised as being very high risk and have 'frequently been given the dubious distinction of being the classic example of decision making under uncertainty' (Newendorp and Schuyler, 2000) .
Business underperformance in the upstream oil and gas industry, and the failure of many decisions to return expected results (Brashear et al, 1999; Brashear et al, 2000; Goode, 2002; Cottrill, 2003; Rose et al, 2003; Durham, 2004) , has led to a growing interest over the past few years in decision making. In the past two decades the majority of oil and gas companies have consistently underperformed in returning the economic metrics that were the justification of their investment decisions, suggesting that their evaluation and decision-making procedures result in either a systematic overestimation of returns or underestimation of the risks.
The oil and gas industry is characterised by uncertainty both in present states-of-nature and a future projection of, for example, costs, prices and volumes that will be recovered. Hence, as decision making is discussed throughout the remainder of this paper, it should be read as meaning decision making under uncertainty.
Much of the industry interest in decision making has centred on promoting the development and use of so-called normative techniques that prescribe how people should ideally make decisions in a way that is consistent with their objectives. Theoretically, these normative techniques, if feasible and correctly applied, should maximise the value of decision outcomes in the long run; however, they have often failed to yield their expected results. This failure is thought to result, in part, from their failure to account for the non-rational or non-optimal ways in which people think and behave.
Decision making is a human enterprise and is probably the most important and pervasive human cognitive practice. It is not surprising, therefore, that understanding human decision making has been a central enterprise for the cognitive sciences as well as the focus of applied research across disciplines like psychology, economics, business, marketing, and the health sciences (Arkes and Hammond, 1986) . Understanding and improving most fields of human endeavour relies on an understanding of what sorts of decisions are involved, how they are made, and how they can be made optimally.
A further problem with decision making is that the determinant of whether a decision is good or not is generally judged by individual outcomes. But the outcome is not solely related to the decision. It is also subject to a large element of chance and to the effectiveness of implementation as well as the processes and information used up to the point at which the decision was made. A decision is defined as 'a conscious, irrevocable allocation of resources with the purpose of achieving a desired objective' (Skinner, 1999, p. 11) .
Finally, decisions are made that involve variable factors such as levels of risk, amounts of time and resources available, sizes of decision and levels of flexibility available to deal with the resolution of chance factors as decisions are implemented. The question arises: how to select appropriate processes according to the type of decision?
In this paper we build on a literature review to explore these areas with the specific objective of demonstrating that HOW DO PEOPlE MAKE DEcIsIOns? normative decision making Decision making has its roots deep within classic economic theory, with most of the foundational work in decision making coming from economic researchers (Bernoulli, 1738; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954; Luce, 1959; Newendorp and Campbell, 1971; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . At the heart of classic economic theory is the assumption that people make decisions based on two principles, self-interest and rationality, to maximise utility. In economics, utility is the measure of the relative value of the outcome. This is generally in dollar terms but could equally be in terms of happiness or gratification. Decision making concerning itself with maximising utility has been termed objective or normative decision making, or decision analysis.
Although the groundwork was laid more than 50 years ago the real breakthroughs in this area have come in the last few decades with the advent of computers. Drawing on the systems engineering models developed during the Second World War together with sensitivity analysis, modern decision analysts seek to 'transform opaque decision problems into transparent decision problems by a sequence of transparent steps' (Howard, 1988) . The development has been in terms of how to solve decisions by focussing on realworld, practice-motivated models. The central focus has been on determining decision alternatives (McNamee and Celona, 1987; Howard, 1988) and specifying the attributes by which the evaluation will be measured (Keeney, 1988; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . Corner and Kirkwood (1991) and Keefer et al (2004) offer a summary of the various methodologies that have been developed. One of the interesting features of this development has been the linkage of the concept of utility with that of risk attitude (Howard, 1988) , thus drawing together the economic framework of the mid-1900s and the concepts of probability theory.
At its heart, normative theory, or the subjective expected utility framework, says that:
'If the preferences of a decision maker satisfied the axioms, then the decision process could be summarised with a numerical expected utility function relating concrete outcomes to behavioral preferences; first the choice behavior, then an application of the theory to infer what utilities and beliefs are consistent with those preferences.' (Hastie, 2001, p. 658) But there are two limits to this framework as enunciated by Hastie (2001) . The first is that the framework is not complete-much happens outside the framework prior to information coming into it that is not properly described. Secondly, it does not provide a description of the human decision-making process.
The upstream oil and gas industry eagerly tests and adapts the principles and methods unearthed in normative decision making (Rose, 1987; Watson, 1998; Newendorp and Schuyler, 2000) . This laboratory-directed approach (Ball and Savage, 1999; Galli et al, 1999; Bailey et al, 2000) of the upstream oil and gas industry places it, along with the finance industry, at the forefront of the use of decision analysis (Schuyler, 1997) . Although the industry purports to adopt these techniques it does so only partially, that is, it is not ubiquitous and it is rarely applied to full capability.
The use of normative decision making in the upstream oil and gas industry has tended to be project-and even personspecific. As a theory, principle or process is documented in the decision-making arena, it is quickly adapted into the upstream oil and gas industry by a specific person. If it works-that is, it is easy to implement and adds value-it is retained. If it does not work, it is discarded for the next new idea. It is also true to say that the vast majority of the research in the upstream oil and gas decision-making area has been focussed on quantitative decision analysis.
A recent series of papers discussing the benefits of implementing normative decision-making tools as best practice (Lamb et al, 1999; Jonkman et al, 2000; Simpson et al, 2000; Begg et al, 2001 ) is quite enlightening. For the first time research in the oil and gas industry has claimed to demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between business performance and using best practice in decision analysis. This work claims to demonstrate that the application of normative decision making will lead to maximisation of value if the best practice decision analysis processes are adhered to.
Descriptive decision making
There has been a great deal of work carried out over the last 20 to 30 years, within the cognitive psychology discipline, in observing how people actually do make decisions under uncertainty. In 1956, Herbert Simon observed that decision makers fell short of maximising utility, stating that 'evidently organisms adapt well enough to satisfice; they do not, in general, optimise' (Simon 1956, p129) . He showed that maximisation, what he termed optimisation, the objective of the expected utility theory, required perfect information in all areas; whereas people were happy to use less than perfect information-they put boundaries on their rationality. He had introduced two new terms that remain central to decision making through to this day: satisficing, which refers to choosing such that most important needs are satisfied, and bounded rationality, which refers to the limited form of rationality displayed by decision makers. Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974 for his groundbreaking research.
Although Simon stated that he was researching normative decision making, his insights led to the separation of the decision-making field into two branches-normative or objective decision making and descriptive or behavioural decision making (Bell et al, 1988) . The basic difference being that normative decision making describes how decisions should be made to achieve utility maximisation, while descriptive decision making simply describes how decisions are made by people.
Descriptive decision making has found that people tend to make decisions by choosing such that they satisfy their most important needs even if they do not have all the information and their choice is not the optimal solution-it is good enough-they satisfice rather than maximise.
Simon's work was built on during the next 20 to 30 years by many researchers. Two of note are Kahneman and Tversky. They are known for their development of the heuristics and biasses school of thought, which has been the most influential psychological research program on decision making in the last 30 years. In fact, Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for their work (Tversky having died in 1996) . In simple terms they espouse that when people are faced with making a decision under uncertainty they simplify the task by relying on heuristics-or rules of thumb, as they called them (Kahneman et al, 1982) . In many cases these heuristics yielded nearly optimal solutions using much less time and energy than alternative, normative decision-making processes. There were, however, many situations where the heuristics led to major biassessystematic deviations from the answers that would result from normative decision making-resulting in errors of judgement, and therefore substantially suboptimal decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Glovich et al, 2002) . These biasses are cognitive in nature and stem from the nature of human thought processes. For example, the human mind is well adapted to making relative judgments but poorly adapted to making absolute judgments, with the result that a number of biasses are observed when people are asked to make absolute estimates.
The 30 years of research has resulted in a catalogue of biasses together with explanations in terms of heuristics. Table 1 is a summary of many of the biasses that have been uncovered in the intervening 30 years together with the heuristics behind them. The three primary heuristics have been termed representativeness, availability, and adjustment and anchoring. 1. Representativeness refers to the way in which people assess the frequency of two events by how representative one event is of the other. 2. The availability heuristic describes the tendency people have to base estimates on how many events of a particular type they can remember, that is, how many instances are available to memory. 3. The final heuristic is termed anchoring and adjustment. When asked to give an estimate people commonly will use a single number as a starting point, known as the anchor, and then adjust from there to reach their estimate. The biasses develop when people rely too much on the anchor. One of the basic assumptions underlying the heuristics and biasses paradigm is that the biasses are bad because they do not lead to maximising utility. Thus, to achieve optimal decision making, some process of debiasing needs to be added to the decision making process. The key response to their research has been a series of works on how to debias decision making (Plous, 1993; Bazerman, 2002) .
Possibly the first attempt to look at these cognitive biasses in the oil and gas industry came in 1976 when Ed Capen documented the results of a survey he gave to groups of petroleum engineers during his Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) Distinguished Lecture tour in 1974-5. In his research, Capen presented the SPE members with a series of questions requiring numerical answers with ranges that described their understanding of uncertainty. Because this was the first foray into descriptive decision making in the industry it is worth noting his conclusions: '1. A large number of technical people have little idea of what to do when uncertainty crosses their path. They are attempting to solve 1976 problems with 1956 methods.
2. Having no good quantitative idea of uncertainty, there is an almost universal tendency for people to underestimate it. Thus, they overestimate the precision of the own knowledge and contribute to decisions that later became subject to unwelcome surprises.
A solution to this problem involves some better understanding of how to treat uncertainties and a realisation that our desire for preciseness in such an unpredictable world may be leading us astray.' (Capen, 1976, p. 843 .) Capen's work explored the overconfidence bias and in his paper he described a methodology of removing the bias through a feedback system. Peter Rose expanded Capen's work; throughout the 1980s and 1990s he taught a risk analysis course which, to obtain attendees' attention, was always started with a very similar experiment to Capen's. He concluded in one of his papers that:
'Many biasses exist in the mental processes by which most people make risky decisions. These biasses tend to produce significant inconsistencies . . . Exploratory performance can be improved through constructive post-mortem analysis of geotechnical predications, review of exploration tactics versus declared strategy, and year-to-year comparison of exploration performance (Rose, 1987, p. 1.) Rose never separated the biasses in his analysis. He amalgamated them under the phrase prospector's myth (Rose, 2000) . Over time he developed his remediation or feedback system to assist in determining estimates for prospect and play analysis. His consulting company claims optimal decision making could be achieved by recognising the biasses and then setting up a system of de-biassing (Citron et al, 2002) . Other authors have found similar results for at least some known biasses (Welsh et al, 2005) .
This focus on bias as systematic deviations from optimal decision making resulting from human cognitive limitations, however, tells only part of the story. In continuing his work on bounded rationality, Simon (1990) found non-rationality was contributed to not just by our internal characteristics or computational capabilitieswhich leads to the heuristics and biasses-but also by the external environment. That is, the information structure of the environment in which the decision is being made. He summarised these findings using an analogy of a pair of scissors. 'Human rational behaviour . . . is shaped like a pair of scissors whose two blades are the structure of the task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor' (Simon, 1990, p. 15) .
The introduction of the task environment to the decision-making playing field helps explain the results of researchers who disagree with Kahneman and Tversky's findings. Gigerenzer (1991) argues that although people do use simplifying rules of thumb to make their decisions, these heuristics may actually assist in making better decisions depending on the environment in which the heuristic is used. His research shows some of Kahneman and Tverky's biasses can be removed, or at least reduced, if the environment in which the decision is made is changed (Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) .
The decision to acquire a 3D seismic survey instead of a 2D survey is a good example from the oil and gas industry to show the difference between these two research approaches. Some form of value of information analysis is usually undertaken, which requires Bayesian updating of subjective probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky would argue that in assessing probabilities there is a need to clearly understand subjective probability theory. But humans have difficulty doing this. Gigerenzer, on the other hand, claims that if the task environment (that is, the terminology used to describe the problem) is changed from one of probabilities to one of frequencies, people actually make near-optimal assessments of probabilities. That is, simply altering the environment in which the decision is made by looking at past frequencies, rather than a priori and posterior probabilities within Bayesian updating, improves people's ability to solve these problems. This improvement, it is argued, results from people's natural ability to understand and compare frequencies compared with their inability to do the same with probabilities.
WHAt Is A GOOD DEcIsIOn?
Although the aim of decision making is generally thought to be obvious, many times it is not always apparent. In the previous discussion, several terms are used to indicate the aim. These terms include maximising, optimising and satisficing. The three terms do not refer to the same thing. In mathematics, maximisation is the process of finding the maximum, either local or general, of a function. This denotes the very best answer theoretically possible. In classic economic theory, the stated aim of maximising utility lies in obtaining the absolute best theoretical answer. Optimising, although referring to the same principle in mathematics as maximising, is generally used to mean 'the best or most favourable' (Delbridge et al, 1990 ) and incorporates the fact that there may be constraints. The present usage of Simon's term satisficing is to select the first option that meets minimum standards, as opposed to taking the time needed to choose the best possible option. These three terms describe a spectrum of results ranging from absolute theoretical best through to meeting minimum standards. Hence, when a decision maker says they want to make a good decision, what are they actually saying? Do they want to make a decision that maximises utility, optimises utility or satisfies utility? For the remainder of this paper the assumption is made that the aim of good decision making is to optimise.
Whether a decision is good or not is generally judged by its outcomes; but the outcome is not solely related to the decision. There are three main criteria that influence outcome: the processes, information and logic with which the decision is made; the effectiveness of implementation of the decision; and, chance. As the latter two elements are beyond the control of the decision maker, it is argued here that the best indicator of a good decision is a good process. Bratvold et al (2002) clarify this idea by separating decision processes from outcomes. To reinforce this distinction they use Russo and Schoemaker's (2002) matrix of decisions and outcomes (Fig. 1) . The use of the four catchphrases is helpful in distinguishing the differences. It then becomes possible to confront the challenge of building explanatory and predictive accounts of human decision making in complicated real-world situations, such as those found in the oil and gas industry.
For these authors, the goal is still good outcomes, not the process itself; however, they claim that given uncertainty, the best hope for a good outcome is a good process. They agree with Skinner's definition 'a good decision is one that is logically consistent with our state of information and incorporates the possible alternatives with their associated probabilities and figure 1. Decision process vs outcome.
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Outcome Process potential outcomes in accordance with our risk attitude' (Skinner, 1999, p. 16) . Barker (2001) also argues that process is critical for a good decision. He effectively presents a simple matrix that links the decision-making method, the use of a process and the effectiveness of the decision making (Table 2 ). This demonstrates that the best decisions are made using advanced methods, but importantly, directed by a process.
Reviewing several of the published decision-making processes shows them to contain very similar elements. Campbell et al (2001) propose five stages, namely; formulate questions, plan analysis, examine data and premises, perform analysis, and make decision (Fig. 2) . The process is sequential and is designed so that the problem situation is correctly understood ahead of making the decision. Clemen and Reilly (2001) , on the other hand, propose a decision analysis flowchart with seven stages (Fig. 3) . Even though their first four stages correspond to the five elements given by Campbell et al, the major differences lie in the fact that Clemen and Reilly recommend adding some form of pre-decision analysis, which they term sensitivity analysis, and also add the implementation stage. Russo and Schoemaker (2002) concatenate Clemen and Reilly's seven stages down to four key stages: framing, gathering intelligence, coming to conclusions, and learning from the experience. Not only do they succinctly summarise the process but they also add a feedback loop so that learning from the outcome is also included. This feedback occurs after the decision and therefore cannot change the decision, instead it assists in making future decisions. They also argue that interim information may require the decision maker to step back to the previous stage and rework the problem. This makes their process an excellent summary of, what may be called, the dynamic systems decision-making process.
Working from a database of over 400 decisions made by senior managers across North America and Europe, Nutt (2002) proposes that there are a multitude of decisionmaking processes but that there are two of key interest. The first he terms the discovery process, which he proposes is a 'think first approach that increases the chance of being successful'. Whilst the other is 'called an idea-imposition process and is linked to failed decisions' (Nutt, 2002, p. 45) . He argues that although both processes have the same stages it is the order in which they are undertaken that leads to success or failure. Essentially, thinking first will heighten the chance of success whilst imposing a preconceived idea will most likely lead to failure.
It is asserted that if a good process is used more consistently then the results of decisions will, in the long run, be more consistently good and the probability of obtaining a good outcome from an individual decision is increased.
Any good process should contain the following four phases: 1. framing-this is where the decision is defined and the objectives and alternatives searched out; 2. modelling-where each alternative is evaluated against the objectives and the objectives weighed against their ability to distinguish the best answer; 3. assessing-where trade-offs are evaluated and sensitivity is checked; and, 4. feedback-it is strongly recommended that there be at least two feedback loops: the first comparing the outcome to the original decision and a second where the actual implementation process is also reviewed.
DEcIsIOn tYPE
Given the logical conclusion that a good process is the best way to lead to an optimal, or good, decision, the natural question is: is there only one right process? That is, is there one right process that should be used no matter what sort of decision we are faced with?
In commenting on decision research, Cooksey (2001, p. 362) Table 2 . Matrix of process and method.
figure 2. Decision-making processes. 
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and methodological stances and with respect to learning from a wide range of disciplines.' Essentially, the argument is that discussions or arguments about which decision-making school of thought to follow are not helpful. The real focus should be to think about which decision-making methodology to use as well as when and why that would be the best. The primary premise is that there are optimal processes and tools (Cooksey's 'which') to use for certain types of decision making (Cooksey's 'when') . The secondary premise is that Cooksey's 'why' can be answered by showing that when decision-making tools and processes are tailored for the type of decision, optimal decision making will result.
To look at the which, when and why of oil and gas decision making, however, it is first necessary to determine the types of decision being undertaken. This means there is a need to categorise or classify decisions.
Previous efforts to develop a framework or classification of oil and gas decision making were made by the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA). In 1999 the association published a set of industry guidelines (UKOOA, 1999), which were designed to assist operators with a more open, transparent, soundly based and contextappropriate decision-making process as it related to offshore health, safety and environment. This framework or taxonomy, however, addresses only the more surface engineering-based decisions and highlights the need for a more generic decision-making taxonomy that can be used at all positions within the upstream oil and gas decisionmaking spectrum.
Outside the upstream oil and gas industry a few taxonomies of decision-making have been published to date (Ullman, 1995; Adams, 2000a, 2000b; Nutt, 2001; Boonstra, 2004) . Addressing similar needs in the information systems, nursing, engineering and strategic decision-making fields, these taxonomies were constructed using empirical or other observational means and are thus specific to their industry and again not entirely applicable to the oil and gas industry.
During the past year an oil and gas decision-making taxonomy has been developed (Mackie et al, 2006) using a methodological approach used in mathematical psychology, relying on pair-wise similarity measurements (Shepard, 1974 (Shepard, , 1980 Goldstone, 1999) . This approach assumes that, by having multiple experts compare typical oil and gas decisions, the generic or basic dimensions that form the underlying structure of oil and gas decision making can be uncovered.
This taxonomy, building on established ideas in the human decision-making literature, is itself novel, and involves four different components. 1. Complexity-humans routinely make decisions that can be described as having different levels of complexity. This dimension covers the entire spectrum from simple decisions through to others, which are highly complex. The complexity can result from the number of processes, with multiple outcomes, that need to be undertaken to come to a decision. But it can equally arise due to a single process that is highly intricate.
2. Task constraints-whatever type of decision is being made, in the real world it is almost always subject to constraints. These include, most particularly, time and resource constraints, but there are other constraints that make various decisions uniquely different from each other. This dimension is therefore a series of discrete entities. At the simplest level the constraints impact decisions on an individual basis but as decisions become more complex it is likely that there are multiple constraints coming into play. It is, however, critical that arbitrary constraints are not taken as real constraints. These may include the age-old capital constraint argument-arguing that there is not enough money to do a project when in reality it is available but simply means someone else (outside the regular decision-making stream) has to approve allocating it. Possible constraints, all discrete entities, could include time, capital, availability, technology, size, impact, staff, skills and politics. 3. Ambiguity-real-world decisions can usually succeed or fail in a number of different ways, with different penalties and rewards for different outcomes. To make a choice between two or more options, as is required of a decision maker, they need to measure the relative worth of the options against one another with respect to the stated objectives. In fact, a single decision maker will often have multiple, conflicting objectives that must be weighed against one another to determine the optimal choice. Although these various objectives are all discrete entities, when multiple objectives are required there arises a large ambiguity around the relative importance of different objectives. Some objectives that are common include economic utility, environmental, social and even personal. Value functions perform two roles. They quantify how well a decision alternative performs against a specific objective and they enable all objectives to be compared on a single measurement scale. In their first role, they also capture the relative worth to the decision maker of the various levels of performance. 4. Environment information structure-a key dimension involves the information structure of the environment in which the decision is made. All real-world decision making involves a process of acquiring information, often sought to resolve conflicts between existing information and uncertainty. This usually requires time, and may expend other resources. The usefulness of such a search, then, depends critically on the structure of the availability of information, and the patterns or relationships between the information items. For example, if each new piece of information is novel and useful, then further searching is useful, whereas finding more and more data that supports the same conclusion (i.e. where high dependencies exist) is less useful and dictates a different optimal search procedure. These observations apply even if a decision is not subject to time or resource constraints or has a value function with large rewards and penalties for successful and unsuccessful outcomes.
The proposed oil and gas decision-making taxonomy, then, has four dimensions-three that are continua (complexity, ambiguity and environment information structure) and one that is discretised (task constraint). To graphically display the taxonomy as a template, upon which varying decision types can be presented, it is necessary to display the discrete dimension as the increasing number of constraints. The oil and gas decision-making taxonomy template is shown as Figure 4 .
Having established a methodology to determine decision type it is now possible to see how it is a key to unlocking the potential of decision making under uncertainty.
The unlocking comes from a simple observation by Nutt (2001) . From his database of strategic decisions he empirically derived nine decision types. He then linked his decision types with tactics which best suited that type. Finally he demonstrated that the type/tactic interaction directly related to the success of the decision. Use of a good tactic but on the wrong decision type inevitably led to failure whereas use of the same tactic on another decision type resulted in the greatest chance of success. Put simply, if decision type is matched with decision tactic, better decisions result.
tAIlOrInG DEcIsIOn PrOcEss tO DEcIsIOn tYPE
Restating this concept for the real world of oil and gas decision making-when decision-making processes are tailored to the type of decision, optimised decision making will result.
This hypothesis is clearly linked with Simon's satisficing scissors. Two components are necessary for optimised decision making to occur-decision type and decision process. Just as scissors need to have both blades engaged to work effectively, so too optimised decision making will require the tailoring of decision process to decision type (Fig. 5) . To tailor decision-making processes to decision type it will be necessary to do this in both a conscious and justifiable way.
Naturalistic decision making (Klein, 1998) is an excellent example of tailoring decision-making process to decision type. Working on decision research for the US army, Klein began looking at how fire fighters actually made decisions in the heat of battle. These decisions had certain characteristics, which he lists as time pressure, high stakes, experienced decision makers, inadequate information, goals not clear, poorly defined procedures, dynamic conditions and involving teams. He found that these types of decisions were clearly not being made using the classic rational theory. Rather, decision makers used a step-wise decision-making process which he terms the recognition-primed decision model (Fig. 6 - Klein, 1998, p. 27) .
Under the normative decision-making theory, choosing between alternatives to meet stated objectives makes a decision. Essentially the key element is the choice between at least two alternatives. Klein noticed that in the types of figure 4. Oil and gas decision-making taxonomy template.
figure 5. tailoring decision process to decision type (simon, 1990).
figure 6. Klein's decision-making process: recognition-primed decision model (Klein, 1998) .
decisions he was investigating this was not necessarily the case. In effect the decision makers were simply weighing up clues as to whether they had encountered similar situations previously and, if so, implementing the successful decision from previous experience. If they had not encountered a similar situation they sought to make the present situation similar to one that they had previously encountered. The recognition-primed model is outcome focussed because a successful outcome is the measure as to whether the decision was successful. It is equally important to see that it is also a good example of process-driven decision making. Klein argues that the key to success in naturalistic decision making lies in the expertise of the decision maker. If the process were used by a less experienced decision maker, non-optimal outcomes would almost certainly result. The reason for its success is that the decision-making process is tailored to the decision type. Figure 7 is a characterisation of Klein's decision type using the oil and gas decision-making taxonomy template. This may be termed an axe type decision. The decision is highly complex, involving many factors and evolving over time. Generally the most critical task constraint is time, so constraints are therefore low. But there may also be resource and personnel management factors to be considered. Ambiguity is generally quite low. Generally a single value objective will predominate. For example, a fire fighter's primary concern will be to extinguish the fire, thereby protecting property-although in certain fire situations this may change to saving lives or livestock, which may lead to the sacrifice of property to the fire.
Either way, there will generally only be one value function involved. Finally, naturalistic decision making operates in high-dependency environments. It relies on the decision maker recognising the key attributes of a situation and applying known solutions. That is, additional data is unlikely to alter the decision to be made, so naturalistic decision makers tend not to spend time searching for it, instead relying on their pre-existing domain knowledge.
In the oil and gas industry decisions that require experienced decision makers and involve time pressure, high stakes and inadequate information are generally those associated with operational emergencies such as taking a kick whilst drilling or striving to finish acquiring seismic data as the weather rapidly changes. When faced with decisions of this type, if Klein's recognition-primed decision model is used as the decision-making process, optimised decision making will result. This is why it is critical to have experts on hand during projects that are subject to this type of emergency.
When the end points of the elements of the decisionmaking taxonomy are combined, 16 different decision types can be envisioned. The model developed by Klein would satisfy just one of these types. Obviously further work will be needed to determine the decision-making process required to optimise each of the other decision types. It will be necessary to determine the major decision types used in the upstream oil and gas industry and find the decision processes that lead to optimised decision making for each of these. Experimental psychology laboratory work-along with qualitative, semi-structured interviewing-is now being undertaken to assist in providing recommendations as to the best decision-making processes for some of these critical decision types.
cOnclusIOn
Classic economic theory defines decision making where maximisation of utility is the aim. But real-world decision making in the oil and gas industry is sub-optimal-far below this theoretical maximum. Understanding both decision type and decision process is important to improve real-world decision making and to define what is optimal in any given decision context. The development of a methodology to type decision making is documented. An example of tailoring decision-making processes to one type of decision is given which demonstrates that pragmatically optimised decisionmaking results. Presently research is focussed on determining which decision-making processes are best tailored for many of the major decision types faced in the upstream oil and gas industry. It is believed that this will help the industry turn around a poor decision-making culture and finally realise the potential of decision making under uncertainty.
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